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A two-way challenge:  
Enhancing EU cultural cooperation with Russia 
Domenico Valenza and Fabienne Bossuyt 
Executive summary and policy recommendations 
At a time of cooling relations, culture is arguably the European Union’s most powerful 
instrument to shape positive long-term relations with Russia. Against a convoluted 
international and domestic background, EU cultural action in the country is at present 
supported through a variety of financial instruments and programmes. Stakeholders and 
cultural operators agree that EU engagement in the cultural sphere plays a vital role in breaking 
civil society isolation and fostering long-term openness in Russia. However, in spite of 
considerable improvements, EU action in the cultural realm has still underutilised potential. To 
help the EU overcome this and thus unleash the transformative potential of culture, this policy 
brief proposes the following: 
 The EU should develop a country-based strategic approach to the role of culture in 
external relations with Russia. Building on the recently developed EU strategic approach 
to international cultural relations and drawing inspiration from the policy towards the 
Western Balkans, this new document should enhance EU ambitions and adjust current 
policies to the aspirations and needs of cultural operators and local authorities.  
 This country-specific strategy should involve Russian public authorities as partners, with 
a focus on local administrations and higher education institutions (HEIs), leading to a two-
way and mutual approach to cultural relations. This rests on the principle that, without 
their involvement, EU cultural action in Russia is limited in scope.  
 
 Increased focus on mutuality should lead to adopting ‘cultural cooperation’ as a suitable 
label to refer to cultural action in Russia, instead of the currently used terms 
‘international cultural relations’ and ‘cultural diplomacy’. 
 EU member states should agree on a bilateral framework on cultural cooperation and on 
a new programme co-funded by both the EU and Russia. This could be pursued in the 
framework of the new Creative Europe programme (2021-2027). 
 Within Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) programmes, funding to support cultural 
initiatives should be increased and diversified, allowing non-public entities to benefit 
from a larger share of funding than the current framework allows. This could be done 
with specific calls for proposals targeting civil society organisations (CSOs) working in the 
arts, tourism, cultural heritage, and education. 
 At the same time, more flexible requirements should be adopted to broaden the 
boundaries of civil society and thus involve entities other than CSOs in the cultural field 
(e.g. non-registered organisations, for-profit entities, individuals and artists). 
 Support for smaller projects (under €50,000) should be increased within CBC 
programmes. 
 CBC programmes should all adopt a 2-step submission of concept notes and full 
applications to ease the administrative burden of smaller organisations.  
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Introduction: a new framework for EU cultural relations in Russia 
In recent years, the EU has attempted to develop its own approach to culture in external 
relations. The most important step in this process of policy formulation took place in June 2016, 
when the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) adopted the 
Joint Communication ‘Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations’ (ICR). The 
Joint Communication stemmed from a long-standing debate between the Commission, EU 
member states and their cultural institutes, together with other key stakeholders and was an 
internal exercise designed to enhance synergies between the different DGs and services in 
charge of external relations or cultural matters. In the Joint Communication, it is highlighted 
that EU cultural relations with partner countries aim at advancing the Union's objectives “to 
promote international peace and stability, safeguard diversity, and stimulate jobs and growth” 
(EC & EEAS, 2016). These cultural relations encompass a cross-cutting range of areas, involving 
not just the arts or literature but also inter-cultural dialogue, tourism, education and research, 
heritage protection and artisanship (EC & EEAS, 2016). Accordingly, in line with the EU’s 
comprehensive approach to culture in external affairs, this is also how cultural relations are 
defined in this policy brief. 
More recently, and as part of this awareness process, in April 2019, the Foreign Affairs Council 
approved conclusions on an EU strategic approach to international cultural relations, 
integrating the latter in the range of its foreign policy instruments (Council, 2019). By 
recognising a need for a “decentralised approach” to culture and for clarifying roles and 
expectations of all relevant stakeholders, the strategic approach establishes a framework for 
action and invites member states and EU institutions to increase coordination and promote 
cooperation with third countries. 
When it comes to Russia, its relations with the EU have entered a new and particularly delicate 
phase following the Ukraine crisis, evolving from a more cooperative stance to stagnation and 
mutual distrust. In the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, EU member states agreed 
on a series of restrictive measures including the suspension of bilateral talks on a new 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and visa policy, asset freezes and visa bans. In 
line with the EU’s Global Strategy of June 2016, the strategic partnership and the focus on 
greater integration were replaced by an approach of selective engagement on some key foreign 
policy issues, including climate change and counter-terrorism. Also, in June 2015, the East 
StratCom Task Force presented the Action Plan on Strategic Communication, designed to 
improve EU capacity to respond to Russia’s disinformation activities in the eastern 
neighbourhood and beyond.  
At a time of frosty diplomatic relations, culture has become one of the EU’s major assets, if not 
the major one, to keep existing bridges and build new ones. Three months before the adoption 
of the Joint Communication, the Council of the EU agreed on five principles guiding EU action 
towards Russia. Commitment to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements and 
increased resilience to Russian threats were coupled with an engagement to support civil 
society and people-to-people contacts (fifth principle). As a result, although in the period 
between 2014 and mid-2017 general funds allocation was lower than the amount proposed in 
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the planning phase for Russia (before 2014), this did not apply to such areas as public and 
cultural diplomacy, and education (Coffee, 2019). Current EU cultural action in Russia also 
builds upon other previous initiatives, including the EU preparatory action ‘Culture in EU 
External Relations’, which assessed relations with Russia as one of the ten strategic partners of 
the EU (Isar et al., 2014). Country-based recommendations suggested the use of culture to 
improve relations with Russia, focusing in particular on the fields of arts, heritage, mobility and 
large-scale events. 
In what follows, this policy brief first provides a mapping of the EU’s current instruments and 
initiatives that together form the EU’s cultural policy towards Russia. Next, it conducts a 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis in order to evaluate EU 
cultural action in Russia. Based on this analysis, the final section offers a number of 
recommendations to enhance the EU’s cultural role in Russia in the coming years. 
1. Mapping EU cultural relations with Russia: an overview of existing instruments and 
initiatives 
EU cultural relations with Russia are supported through a variety of implementing actors, 
financial instruments and activities. A visual mapping is offered in Figure 1. The first major 
funding tool is the Partnership Instrument (PI), managed by the Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments (FPI). Created under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework, the PI 
supports EU strategic interests worldwide and includes public and cultural diplomacy as key 
objectives. Within the implementing decision on the 2017 Annual Action programme for PI, the 
Action Fiche for Public and Cultural Diplomacy targets Russia as one of the priority countries for 
2018-20. The Action Fiche includes both regional and thematic initiatives and involves an EU 
budget contribution of €12.4 million for 3 years. It aims at “supporting actors globally in their 
endeavours to further develop the EU's soft power” and involves different methods of 
implementation, including direct management, direct awards, calls for proposal and services 
(EC, 2017a). Three strands target Russia: academic outreach through Jean Monnet activities 
(strand 1); a direct grant supporting the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, a network of 
thematically diverse organisations supporting inter-cultural understanding and memorial work 
among other things (strand 3); and cultural initiatives led by the EU Delegation, including 
material support for the organisation of EU film festivals (strand 4). 
Russian entities are also eligible for the Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) programmes funded 
by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). For 2014-20, around €324 million were 
allocated to CBC intended for Russian entities. About 54% of the funding came from the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), funding EU participants, and ENI, which 
supports Russian organisations. CBC programmes are also co-funded by Russia (27%), EU 
member states and Norway. 
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Figure 1. Visual mapping of actors, instruments and activities involved in EU cultural relations 
with Russia  
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
For the 2014-2020 period, Russia’s border regions are involved in eight CBC land-border 
programmes and also in the Baltic Sea Region, which is implemented by DG Regio. With the 
exception of Kolarctic, all programmes address culture-related priorities (see Table 1). Some 
programmes target the CBC thematic objective ‘Promotion of local culture and preservation of 
historical heritage’ (TO 3 – Karelia, LT-RU, PL-RU), while others support creative industries and 
tourism (TO1 – EE-RU, LV-RU) or education and research (TO2 – South East Finland-Russia). The 
majority of Russian awarded organisations are public subjects, including universities, research 
institutes and government-sponsored entities. Nonetheless, CSOs with a cultural focus are also 
eligible for funding. As an example, the Karelia programme, involving five Russian regional 
subjects, launched two rounds of calls for proposals in 2017 and 2018. Funded projects have 
so far covered a wide range of areas, including arts, cultural heritage, cultural services and 
gastronomic tourism. 
Table 1. 2014-2020 CBC programmes involving Russian regions and with cultural objectives 
Programme EU MS and Partner Countries Eligible Russian federal subjects 
Karelia Finland Arkhangelsk, Karelia, Leningrad, Murmansk, 
Saint Petersburg 
South East Finland-Russia Finland Leningrad, Saint Petersburg 
Estonia-Russia Estonia Leningrad, Pskov, Saint Petersburg 
Latvia-Russia  Latvia Pskov 
Lithuania-Russia  Lithuania Kaliningrad 
Poland-Russia Poland Kaliningrad 
Baltic Sea Region (DG 
REGIO) 
8 EU MS, Belarus and 
Norway 
St. Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, 
Kaliningrad, Karelia, Komi, Leningrad, 
Murmansk, Nenetsky, Novgorod and Pskov 
FPI 
PI 
Action Fiche 
for PCD 
DG EAC 
ERASMUS+ 
Jean 
Monnet, 
  
DG NEAR 
ENI 
CBC 
Programmes 
EU Delegation 
(+own Budget) 
EUNIC 
Clusters  
EUNIC Members’ 
funding 
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Furthermore, under Erasmus+, Russian organisations are eligible as applicants or partners in a 
number of sub-actions. Funding comes from a variety of financial instruments, including ENI 
(€64.8 million), PI (€9.4 million) and the Erasmus+ budget (€10.6 million in 2014-7, Russell, 
2017). Russian organisations can apply for funding under Jean Monnet actions, designed to 
promote excellence in the field of European Union studies worldwide. Between 2015 and 2017, 
the number of applications from Russia has steadily increased (from 78 to 230), and the number 
of contracted projects (12) makes Russia the most awarded partner country next to Ukraine 
and Australia (EC, 2017b). Data on commissioned actions are even more impressive for 2015 
and 2016 (respectively 45 and 33), as a result of additional PI funding allocated for Russia-led 
partnerships in those years. 
As for other Erasmus+ actions, Russian entities are allowed to participate as partners. Within 
Capacity Building in Higher Education (CBHE) participation rates are significant with about 108 
proposals involving Russia out of a total of 833 in 2017 (EC, 2017b). For the same year, about 
5% of the annual CBHE budget was allocated to Russia. As for Erasmus Mundus, providing 
integrated curricula for students and PhD candidates, two Russian organisations are at present 
full partners of Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees, with nine entities operating as 
associates. Finally, educational exchanges are another powerful instrument. In the framework 
of International Credit Mobility, European higher education institutions (HEIs) can design 
mobility agreements with entities from partner countries and set up educational exchanges 
involving students and staff members. Exchanges with Russia have steadily increased in the 
past years and in 2017 they amounted to about 10% of total mobility with partner countries. 
The number of approved projects involving Russian partners increased almost by half between 
2015 (217) and 2017 (291) (EC 2017b). 
A mapping of EU cultural actions should also take into account those actors involved in local 
implementation. Undoubtedly, the EU Delegation in Russia is critical for reaching out to the 
local public within and outside the capital. In line with the 2016 Joint Communication, the 
Delegation appointed a cultural focal point to facilitate cooperation and information sharing 
between member states’ cultural attachés and with Russian authorities (Interview 1). The 
Delegation organises and supports several cultural initiatives. Beside the initiative ‘Discover 
your Europe in the Hermitage’ and a number of film festivals (EU film festivals in Kaliningrad 
and Tomsk, support for the environmental festival ECOCUP), the Delegation has also backed 
the Russian language online platform Europulse, created in 2009 and implemented via periodic 
service contracts. Also, close to cultural relations but broader in scope are the objectives of 
‘Public diplomacy. EU and Russia’ (€2,200,000), designed to support the EU Delegation in its 
outreach activities.  
Finally, EU action in Russia also benefits from the work of the European Union National Institutes 
for Culture (EUNIC), an umbrella organisation of national cultural institutes and with 36 
members from all EU member states. EUNIC was set up in 2006 to promote European cultural 
action. EUNIC Clusters can operate in partner countries in cooperation with the local EU 
Delegation. The EUNIC Cluster Fund supports joint European activities on the ground upon 
application and are financed by both the Commission (via Creative Europe) and voluntary 
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contributions from members. At present, Russia hosts two EUNIC Clusters: EUNIC Russia, based 
in Moscow, and EUNIC Saint Petersburg. The former is the largest with 17 members, while the 
latter involves 11 organisations. 
2. A SWOT analysis of EU cultural relations in Russia 
To evaluate EU cultural action in Russia, a SWOT framework is used here. Strengths and 
Opportunities are categorised based on: 1) the declarative level (purpose), 2) funding 
instruments and managing actors (input), and 3) EU cultural programmes, initiatives and 
projects (output). A double categorisation is adopted for opportunities and threats: the first 
category assesses whether they stem from the European (internal) or Russian (external) 
context; the second relates to the actor involved in cultural practices (state authorities, CSOs 
or general population). 
2.1 Strengths  
EU cultural action in Russia features seven significant strengths (see Table 2). A first major 
strength can be observed at the declarative level. The Joint Communication and the more 
recent strategic approach have flagged EU institutions’ interest in re-structuring their existing 
action and providing opportunities for enhanced cooperation among the Commission, EEAS and 
member states. Perhaps more importantly, as part of its framework for action, the strategic 
approach aims at building “common projects and joint actions in third countries”. To support 
this, it encourages the development of “adequate frameworks and instruments” (Council, 
2019). When it comes to the country-based level, the fifth principle has shown that increased 
awareness of and resilience to Russian threats (including an effort on strategic communication) 
should not be seen as disengagement on dialogue and cooperation with civil society and 
general populations: rather, in the current context both are needed more than ever before.  
Furthermore, EU cultural action in Russia has so far benefited from a variety of financial 
instruments. Cooling relations have not undermined Russia’s participation in ENI CBC, and 
financial support for cultural activities within this instrument has steadily increased since 2014, 
and so has the number of dedicated projects. Under the PI, Russia has enjoyed additional 
funding for Jean Monnet initiatives in 2015 and 2016, and a great share of the EU Delegation’s 
information and communication budget has been devoted to cultural purposes (Interview 1). 
Overall, increased financial allocations have boosted the volume of cultural activity emanating 
from Brussels, and high participation rates in Erasmus+ initiatives are evidence that the EU 
remains a strong educational partner for Russian HEIs, students and staff. 
Of course, renewed EU engagement with Russia would have not been sufficient without 
adaptation measures to overcome the distrust of Russian state authorities. An illustrative 
example is the EU’s response to the cancellation of Europe Days, an annual event showcasing 
European cultures in different Russian cities organised by the EU Delegation and national 
cultural institutes. In the aftermath of the crisis and the EU’s decision to impose sanctions on 
Russia, members of the Russian government voiced their discontent regarding the initiative, 
which resulted in the EU cancelling Europe Days. Later in 2015, then EU Ambassador to Russia 
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Vygaudas Usackas confirmed that the cancellation of Europe Days was a result of domestic 
discontent (EEAS, 2015). This temporary stalemate was successfully overcome with the setup 
of ‘Discover your Europe in the Hermitage’, an annual initiative co-organised by the Delegation 
and the State Hermitage Museum in Saint Petersburg, together with EU member state 
consulates and cultural institutes.  
Table 2. SWOT analysis of EU cultural relations in Russia. 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES 
PURPOSE: A MORE DEFINED THEMATIC (JC AND STRATEGIC 
APPROACH) AND COUNTRY-RELATED (FIVE GUIDING PRINCIPLES) 
FRAMEWORK 
INPUT: VARIETY OF INSTRUMENTS SUPPORTING CULTURAL 
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
INPUT: DELEGATION’S INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
BUDGET DEVOTED TO CULTURAL OBJECTIVES 
OUTPUT: INCREASED VOLUME OF ACTIVITY ON CULTURE 
OUTPUT: SHOWN RESILIENCE AND AGREED ON ADAPTATION 
MEASURES 
OUTPUT: CLEAR CULTURAL FOCUS IN MOST CBC PROGRAMMES 
OUTPUT: HIGH PARTICIPATION RATES IN ERASMUS+ INITIATIVES 
 
PURPOSE: LACK OF A COUNTRY-BASED STRATEGIC APPROACH  
INPUT: FUNDING TO CULTURAL OPERATORS DOES NOT MATCH 
RHETORICAL ASPIRATIONS 
INPUT: NO RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP OR BILATERAL AGREEMENT 
WITHIN CREATIVE EUROPE 
OUTPUT: LITTLE TO NO OPPORTUNITIES FOR NON-REGISTERED 
ORGANISATIONS, FOR-PROFIT ENTITIES OR INDIVIDUALS 
OUTPUT: LACK OF SUPPORT FOR SMALLER PROJECTS 
OUTPUT: CBC FUNDING TO AUTHORITIES DWARFS SUPPORT FOR 
CSOS  
OUTPUT: FOCUS LARGELY CENTRED AROUND MOSCOW AND CROSS-
BORDER REGIONS 
OUTPUT: CHALLENGING PROGRAMME REQUIREMENTS  
(NO 2-STEPS SUBMISSION) 
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS 
INTERNAL OPPORTUNITY: DEFINING NEW MULTIANNUAL 
FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 
EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITY (STATE): INTEREST IN CULTURAL 
COOPERATION  
EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITY (CSOS): CULTURAL OPERATORS SEE EU 
ACTIVITY AS FUNDAMENTAL 
EXTERNAL OPPORTUNITY (PUBLIC): RUSSIANS SEE THE EU AS AN 
IMPORTANT PARTNER FOR CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL 
EXCHANGES 
 
INTERNAL THREAT: RUSSIA DOWNGRADED IN EU AND NATIONAL 
AGENDAS 
INTERNAL THREAT: LACK OF SUPPORT FOR COOPERATION WITH 
RUSSIAN AUTHORITIES 
EXTERNAL THREAT (STATE): TIGHTER LEGAL FRAMEWORK SINCE 
2012 
EXTERNAL THREAT (STATE): GOVERNMENT DISCOMFORT FOR TOP-
DOWN CULTURAL ACTION 
EXTERNAL THREAT (CSOS): SELF-CENSORSHIP IS MORE LIKELY 
EXTERNAL THREAT (CSOS): ‘FOREIGN’ ACTIVITY PUT CSOS AT RISK 
EXTERNAL THREAT (PUBLIC): CHANGE IN EU IMAGE AMONG PUBLIC 
OPINION 
2.2 Weaknesses 
Despite the current strengths of EU cultural action in Russia, the EU’s policy suffers from some 
major weaknesses. First and foremost, although the current policy framework has further 
clarified the importance of cultural relations in the country, the EU lacks at present a 
comprehensive document presenting its strategic approach to culture in Russia and adjusting 
its objectives to the needs of cultural operators and local authorities. Also, the current 
framework does not clarify the interplay between cultural relations and strategic 
communication and whether these should be integrated in a common framework. Overall, a 
new strategic document should neither just list EU major achievements in Russia, nor 
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emphasise general EU cultural superpower: if the former were a worthless exercise, the latter 
would become counterproductive. Rather, it should summarise recent lessons after Crimea and 
confirm EU commitment to cultural cooperation with Russian stakeholders. 
At the input level, available funding mechanisms have not yet matched rhetorical aspirations. 
The overall volume of funding devoted to cultural actors remains relatively small and at present 
targets mainly Moscow or cross-border regions, with few to no opportunities for entities 
operating in more remote areas. No thematic calls for proposals on cultural cooperation have 
been published since 2009. Although the EU-funded Creative Europe programme is open in 
principle for bilateral or multilateral cooperation with selected countries, no action has taken 
place through this financial instrument.  
Shortcomings are also identified on the output side of EU cultural action. Within CBC 
programmes, most of the approved projects in the first round of calls of proposals are mainly 
implemented by public authorities, including district and city councils, public museums and 
parks. With the notable exception of the Karelia programme, in which a few CSOs are the 
leading organisations, this applies to South East Finland-Russia (whose regions are also covered 
by Karelia), Lithuania-Russia and Poland-Russia. Together with concerns about reduced support 
for non-state actors (Interview 4), cultural operators remarked that at present EU cultural 
actions lack funding for smaller projects (i.e. actions below €50,000). EUNIC Clusters are a 
partial exception, but the scope of their action focuses mainly on Moscow and Saint Petersburg. 
In addition, EUNIC’s funding opportunities remain rather occasional.  
In terms of status, few opportunities could be found for for-profit entities, a legal position that 
some cultural operators are seeking to facilitate cooperation with non-Russian actors 
(Interview 2), while non-registered organisations remain outside of EU support for (and 
definition of) civil society. Within CBC, cultural operators pointed to some technicalities that 
could hamper CSO participation, including the absence of a 2-step submission of concept notes 
and full applications in such CBC programmes as Latvia-Russia, Poland-Russia, and South East 
Finland-Russia for standard projects. Some cultural operators observed that concept notes 
reduce administrative work when proposals do not match the programme objectives and 
managing authorities decline applications (Interviews 4, 6). 
2.3 Opportunities 
Against this background, this policy brief identifies four opportunities to enhance EU cultural 
relations in Russia. A first opportunity comes from the internal scenario and relates to current 
debates and negotiations on the new multiannual financial framework 2021-27. The most 
relevant example involves Creative Europe: in May 2018, the Commission agreed a proposal 
for the 2021-27 programme. Article 3 of the general provisions stresses that it should seek to 
develop “European cultural diversity and Europe’s cultural heritage” and to reinforce 
international cultural relations (EC, 2018). In October 2018, the EP Committee on Culture and 
Education presented its draft report on the 2021-27 Creative Europe programme. Among 
others, the report suggested that activities involving an international dimension should be 
performed under the name of Creative Europe Mundus (EP, 2018). More recently, in its 
8 | VALENZA & BOSSUYT 
 
resolution adopted in first reading and dated 28 March 2019, the European Parliament added 
a new paragraph inviting the EU to “proactively” promote agreements with new countries (EP, 
2019). Taken together, these recent policy developments provide a prospect of enhanced 
cultural action in Russia through the major European instrument for cultural cooperation. 
Opportunities also arise from Russia’s domestic context. Interviews suggested that, although 
EU cultural action is clearly no easy task, cultural cooperation is possible and in some cases 
proactively sought by public authorities (Interviews 1, 4, 6), and, in particular, by local 
administrations. Two examples come from the EU Delegation’s portfolio of activities. The first 
is the EU Film Festival in Kaliningrad, which has seen 14 editions so far and no disruption 
following the annexation of Crimea. The event is organised in cooperation with the Government 
of Kaliningrad Oblast. A second and perhaps more striking example comes from the city of 
Tomsk, which has so far hosted two editions of a local EU Film Festival. The Oblast government 
proposed the Delegation should replicate the Kaliningrad festival format in the city (Interview 
1). On the occasion of its second edition, authorities invited EU member state ambassadors to 
attend the opening session. Spontaneous approaches from public authorities and the 
participation of 18 EU member state embassies and 12 ambassadors at the opening of the 
second edition suggest that, as soon as state authorities are recognised as full stakeholders in 
EU cultural events (and by EU institutions as such), cooperation can bear positive results.  
Finally, the positive attitude of local authorities towards CBC programmes has also been 
confirmed, another example of cooperation on an equal footing. Under the Karelia programme, 
for instance, the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Karelia has supported applications from 
cultural organisations and showed willingness to cover the 10% co-funding requirements of the 
programme (Interview 6).  
Of course, these findings do not call into question the fact that the power vertical remains at 
the core of Russia’s institutional design, and that engagement with Russian authorities is 
troublesome because of their top-down nature. However, what these findings highlight instead 
is a more nuanced picture of Russian public authorities, especially at the local level, which 
opens up potential avenues for cooperation and opportunities to advance the EU’s agenda and 
priorities in the country.  
Although positive attitudes towards EU cultural action among CSOs is less surprising than that 
of state authorities, it should not be undervalued. Cultural operators agree that the EU has 
increasingly become an important actor in this area and expect the EU to close its gap between 
rhetorical commitments and actual engagements. EU backing and dialogue are considered 
critical to support the cultural sector, and a possible, albeit unlikely, withdrawal would be 
shattering in the current domestic context (Interviews 2, 4, 5). 
2.4 Threats 
Seven threats for EU cultural relations with Russia can be discerned. A first threat comes from 
oscillating public support. On the one hand, according to a study commissioned by the FPI in 
2015 and involving public opinion surveys in ten countries, including Russia, the EU appears to 
remain a strong cultural partner (Public Policy and Management Institute et al., 2015). About 
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72% of Russian respondents agreed that Europe should engage more in cultural exchanges with 
Russia. On a similar note, 54% saw the EU as an important partner for educational exchanges. 
On the other hand, data from the Levada Center show that, since the Ukraine crisis, Russians’ 
attitudes towards the EU have become overwhelmingly negative, reaching the lowest point 
since figures started being collected in 2003 (Levada Center, 2019). Some improvements were 
recently observed with positive attitudes progressing from 19% in September 2014 to 36% in 
November 2018, but the EU’s positive image is yet to be restored to earlier levels. Although it 
is hard to establish a precise correlation between worsening image and decline in cultural 
interest, some cultural operators reported that engaging with the Russian public on EU-related 
activities has become more challenging since 2014 (Interview 4, 5). 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the major threats for using culture in external relations 
come from the state level. Operators agree on the fact that Russia’s tighter legal framework on 
domestic civil society has also affected cultural entities (Interview 2, 3, 4, 5). For instance, under 
the Foreign Agent Law, CSOs have been obliged to either register as ‘foreign agents’, with 
additional administrative burden and potential risks for their representatives, or discontinue 
funding by international donors. As a result, local operators highlight two risks. First, ‘foreign’ 
activities put CSOs at risk: working with European artists can be delicate even when actions are 
purely artistic (Interviews 2, 4). This can also apply to public or mixed actors, who are in 
principle excluded from this legislation. A staff member of a public research centre cooperating 
with European cultural entities lamented the very vulnerable position of the institute within its 
broader academic reality, noting that such a work focus was particularly unwelcomed by central 
authorities (Interview 5). A second risk relates to increased self-censorship: operators may in 
fact lack willingness to engage in international projects with European partners and prefer 
strengthening the domestic focus of their work (Interview 3, 6). 
On a final note, the cause of stronger cultural relations between the EU and Russia faces two 
internal threats. One is related to current European and national agendas: in the past months, 
Russia’s assertive foreign policy in the shared neighbourhood has been downgraded in 
European and national political agendas to the advantage of other pressing priorities (migrant 
and refugee crisis, Brexit, EP Elections, the populist rise across Europe). Perhaps more 
importantly, re-energising cultural cooperation with Russia through state authority 
involvement could be questioned by those EU member states with a more critical stance vis-à-
vis Moscow (i.e. the Baltic States, Sweden and Poland) and pushing for ‘state-free’ people-to-
people contacts. 
3. Strengthening EU cultural cooperation with Russia: policy recommendations 
The SWOT analysis suggests that EU cultural engagement with Russia has borne fruits. Against 
a convoluted international and domestic background, culture has become the only channel to 
engage with the Russian public and to support local operators, and as such, it has emerged as 
a potentially powerful tool to positively shape EU relations with Russia. A variety of instruments 
have so far supported cultural action, and the increased volume of activity has been welcomed 
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by local stakeholders, which consider EU activity fundamental for breaking their isolation and 
fostering networking opportunities with international partners.  
Nevertheless, EU engagement in the cultural realm has significant underutilised potential. In 
line with the findings of the SWOT, this policy brief proposes a series of recommendations that 
could help strengthen EU cultural cooperation in Russia. 
First and foremost, it is time for the EU to develop a country-based strategic approach 
addressing the role of culture in external relations with Russia. While there is no doubt that 
both the Joint Communication, the strategic approach and the guiding principles have 
encouraged exchange and discussions on the subject, the EU should now raise its ambitions 
and adjust its policy to the aspirations and needs of cultural operators and local authorities. In 
this regard, a successful example of a regional cultural strategy can be found in the Western 
Balkans, including the Western Balkans Cultural Heritage Route that forms part of it. The 
strategic approach confirms the need for “a common strategic vision developed at local level 
by the member states, their diplomatic and consular representations, their cultural institutes, 
EUNIC, EU delegations and local stakeholders” (Council, 2019). Given its role as a key strategic 
partner, Russia should be a primary target for EU engagement in the cultural realm. 
Contrary to an approach exclusively aimed at people-to-people relations, this country-specific 
strategy should also clarify that public authorities are a partner, be they co-donors, co-
organisers or simple stakeholders in cultural events. Discomfort with top-down action should 
therefore be allayed through an increased cooperative and two-way approach, in which local 
administrations and HEIs can cooperate on an equal footing. In doing so, the expression 
‘cultural cooperation’ should be preferred over the current ‘international cultural relations’ or 
‘cultural diplomacy’, to further signal EU readiness to engage jointly in the cultural realm.  
Of course, as mentioned such an approach would likely face the criticism of those member 
states pushing for a stronger stance towards Russian bodies. Why then should the EU recognise 
the role of public authorities and give them proper legitimisation while member states hold 
them, rightly, accountable for breaking international law? To address this reasonable concern, 
three points should be raised. First and foremost, this strategy would just confirm that the EU 
is also ready to engage selectively with Russia in the field of culture. Clearly, ad hoc cooperation 
with Russia is neither an endorsement of everything that domestic authorities do, nor a return 
to business as usual.  
Secondly, this policy brief has revealed an inconvenient but crucial fact: EU cultural action will 
be limited in scope if it does not involve public authorities. Evidence from the local context 
suggests that to a large extent cultural activities are possible only when public bodies are 
involved in some way. For instance, CBC is co-funded by Russia, and most EU Delegation events 
have taken place in cooperation with public authorities. As for Erasmus+ actions, they almost 
exclusively involve governmental HEIs. This is perhaps not the Union’s preferred or sought-after 
roadmap, but is the most likely to succeed in the interest of all parties. Thirdly, this strategic 
approach should not be seen as EU over-reliance on Russia’s public authorities or the 
downgrade of the Union’s major priorities in the country in order to suit the regime. 
Cooperation and co-creation, rather than dependence, should guide selective engagement. 
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Therefore, the strategic approach should formalise current avenues of cooperation and 
highlight its mutual benefits. 
Obviously, a new country-based strategy should also clarify the interplay between ICR and 
strategic communication. Although the Action Plan on Strategic Communication was conceived 
as a defensive response to disinformation activities in the eastern and Russian-speaking 
neighbourhood, improved communication of EU cultural action in Russia should also be a key 
objective of the new strategy. This could be done through increased support for Russian-
language communication materials on EU initiatives and opportunities, similar to what the East 
StratCom Task Force has prepared for the Eastern Partnership countries. 
Together with a stronger emphasis on the declarative level, more should be done to support 
cultural operators across Russia. Enhancing the people-to-people dimension of EU-Russia 
relations also means a stronger support for CSOs engaged in the field of culture. Ideally, this 
should lead to a bilateral framework on cultural cooperation and to the launch of a programme 
co-funded by both EU and Russia. This programme could build on the successful experience of 
CBC and be pursued in the framework of the new Creative Europe. As seen above, this would 
also be in line with the strategic approach, which addresses in its framework the 
implementation of joint actions, frameworks and instruments involving local stakeholders. This 
pathway would correct a number of current shortcomings: first, it would close the gap between 
rhetoric and resources; second, it would enlarge the geographical focus of cultural action, which 
is currently strictly limited to cross-border regions and the Moscow area; third, by involving 
local authorities, it would allay their possible discomfort and scepticism, and secure cultural 
operators’ participation in a ‘safer’ environment. 
Improved cultural cooperation should also be done in the framework of current instruments. 
In the case of CBC programmes, funding to support cultural initiatives should be increased and 
diversified, allowing non-public entities to benefit from a greater share of funding than under 
current CBC programmes. This could be done with ad hoc calls for proposals targeting the civil 
society sector working on tourism, cultural heritage, education, and the like. In doing so, more 
flexible requirements should also be adopted to involve entities other than CSOs in the cultural 
field. A non-exhaustive list would include non-recognised organisations, for-profit entities as 
well as individuals operating on their own. Finally, flexibility should also be sought on the 
financial side, with a support for smaller projects and the adoption of a 2-step submission of 
concept notes and full applications in all CBC programmes. 
Conclusion 
This policy brief sought to highlight how and why culture is currently the EU’s most powerful 
instrument to shape positive long-term relations with Russia. Of course, improving cultural 
cooperation should not be seen as a way to ‘forgive and forget’ Moscow’s recent stance or to 
return to business as usual. Rather, in line with the EU’s Global Strategy and current framework 
for relations with Russia, selective cooperation in the area of culture offers a major opportunity 
to defuse tension and break the isolation of Russia’s civil society. Taking the aspirations and 
needs of local operators into consideration, the transformative potential of culture should be 
at the core of any future strategic approach. Overall, shaping a more open Russia is in the 
interest of everyone, be they Russians, Europeans or common neighbours.  
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